Introduction
The subtitle might be mutual great expectations and, to a certain extent, mutual disappointment. NATO made a bold decision in the late 1990s to start expanding towards Eastern Europe. It was obvious that none of the candidate countries was militarily prepared to be a full-fledged member of the Alliance; the decision to take some of them into NATO was first and foremost a political one. The expansion wished to prevent the emergence of a potential security grey zone in the middle of Europe, as well as to create a zone of political, economic and social stability as the Atlantic Alliance is not only about a collective security organization in the traditional sense, but it is also a community of states which share the same values. It was also expected in the capitals of the member countries that the new allies would do their best to catch up with the old members in, among others, military matters too. However, by the time the first three Central European countries joined the Alliance, NATO's mission had already substantially changed. 'Out-of-area' missions had replaced the predominantly territorial defence posture and these new missions, as a response to some new types of challenges, had become more complex in nature too. The new members, in general, had been looking for NATO membership mainly because of the Cold War-era security guarantees and were, on the whole, unprepared to contribute meaningfully to the capabilities of the organization. These countries, Hungary one among them, were beset with a long list of military, political, economic and social problems. They were incapable to address all of them simultaneously; the security questions were usually pushed into the background by the more pressing other issues.
This chapter intends to discuss the case of a country which had arguably the highest expectations about NATO membership both within and without. Hungary was a 'poster boy' for setting the pace of transformation from a closed society to an open one. Hungary was also the country, which had become a de facto member of the Alliance before formal accession to it on account of its geopolitical position and the role it was playing during the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Hungary also became the 'whipping boy' in the early 2000s foroften only the perceived -lack of adequate capabilities and political will to be a provider of security instead of a consumer of security. This transition is the subject proper of this chapter. It wishes to assess the actual performance of Hungary as a NATO member as well as the perceived and real weaknesses of its membership. Special attention is paid to the military capabilities, where Budapest has been clearly underperforming, and the political will, in which the country's record is much better.
Hungary's security environment
Amidst the sweeping changes in East and Central Europe starting in 1989, perhaps the most serious direct challenge to the national security of Hungary was posed by the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Contemporary Hungarian Government, and almost each one to follow, was keen on reconciling Realpolitik with democratic values in the broadest sense. Thus, despite the potential danger that the Serbs would take steps against the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians in Voivodina, Budapest sided with the victims of Serbian aggression, foremost among them was Croatia. The rapid downsizing of the military left Hungary extremely vulnerable in face of potential aggression along the southern border; in fact, in some cases Hungarian airspace was violated and even a few bombs were dropped on Hungarian territory during the initial stages of the Balkan wars. 1 A resurgent Soviet Union (or Russia) or a war in the vicinity meant classic conventional threats to Hungary. It became obvious practically to everyone in Central Europe that the countries in the region would acquire hard security only through membership in the Euro-Atlantic community. Although the countries in the wider Central Europe, that is, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, naturally do not share 100 per cent the outlook on their own security and threat perceptions, a common characteristic feature of theirs is that the region suffers from 'strategic dependency'. One may add that, by definition, small countries
